Agent-Patch Simulation time series:
BENIGN ENVIRONMENT/MIXED INITIAL POPULATION

Defector: Yellow     Cooperator: Light Blue    

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Frame 1: Cycle 0;
Cooperators: 40
Defectors: 40
Frame 2: Cycle 1025
Cooperators: 1925
Defectors: 1429
Frame 3: Cycle 1770
Cooperators: 3695
Defectors: 3516
Frame 4: Cycle 2675
Cooperators: 195
Defectors: 3168

wpe1F.jpg (11984 bytes)The way that the evolution of cooperation is usually studied is via a game called the "prisoner's dilemma".

Payoffs Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3 -1
Defect 4 0

It is simplest to interpret the game as follows: Agents pair up at random and each has the opportunity to confer a benefit on the other at a small cost to themselves. There are two strategies. Cooperate both confers and accepts. Defect accepts but does not confer. If the benefit is worth 4 and the cost 1, you get the payoffs in the table. In in the simplest cases, whether it is rational agents or populations with inherited strategies, or even imitation on the basis of success, Defect always wins. In order for cooperate to win, you need something a little bit complicated. A segregation mechanism, or some way that players can condition what they do on some information about the opponent. In Step one, we just let them play.

Just to make sure the simulator  does what you would expect, we run it initially without mortality risk, with the same initial configuration as will be used in Step 2. As expected, the cooperators are all driven out by the defectors. What is interesting is the way cooperators form a wavefront that moves out ahead of the defector migration. Note that the movement rate for all agents is the same, and the probability of movement is the same in all directions (except at the edges. The grid is not wrapped.) So it is not individual movement rate that accounts for this phenomenon. Rather, cooperators produce resource which results in increased reproduction. Instead of cooperator populations stabilizing at the patch resource carrying capacity (5 agents per patch) as defector populations do, they climb to the level at which crowding costs kick in, which is 20 agents. If 20 agents have four times the chance of moving to a given patch that 5 agents do, then cooperator populations can move up to four times as fast. But the defectors nibbling at the rear of the cooperator wave are getting this resource as well, which is why they are able to keep up at all. If open space were unlimited, perhaps coopertors could outrun the defectors indefinitely.

The other thing to realize is that sometimes the wavefront phenomenon does not emerge because not enough cooperators get out in front. The typical time to cooperator extinction when the wavefront forms is about 3000 cycles, as shown in the bar graph of exintion times for 50 of these trials. But  sometimes they are driven extinct much more quickly than that, in between 700 and 1400 cycles. This happened in 16% of the trials run. This explains why the pattern demonstrated in the next step does not always emerge.

Step 2 is where things start to get interesting.

 

Copyright © William Harms 1999. (Author, designer, and programmer.)
Evolving Artificial Moral Ecologies Project
Centre for Applied Ethics, UBC